Na alle nepnieuws (of ‘fake news’) over hacks en andere manipulaties ‘door Rusland gepleegd’ in het buitenland, bracht Wikileaks gisteren het bericht, waarin de echte grote smeerlap voor de zoveelste keer werd ontmaskerd: de VS en dan m.n. de CIA!!
Zo bracht de CIA o.a. besmette software op het net, waarmee niet alleen ‘slimme’ telefoons en computers kunnen worden gehackt, maar zelfs ‘slimme’ televisies’ zijn niet veilig (die als microfoon kunnen dienen, ook als ze uitgeschakeld zijn..)…….
Wikileaks publiceerde de eerste 8.000 pagina’s, met diverse handleidingen die de CIA en NSA gebruiken om in te breken. De CIA heeft een team van 500 mensen vrijgemaakt, die e.e.a. hebben uitgedokterd, waar de NSA bewust buiten werd gehouden.
De boel ‘was zo goed beveiligd’ door de CIA, dat niet alleen Wikileaks erbij kon, maar bijvoorbeeld ook misdaadorganisaties………..
U snapt natuurlijk, dat de zoveelste openbaring over smerige streken van de VS, niet dezelfde ophef geven in het westen, als de leugen over Russische hacks………..
Hieronder een artikel dat ik gisteren ontving van Anti-Media, met daaronder een aantal vragen over de nieuwste openbaarmakingen van Wikileaks, bedoeld voor de pers, waar uzelf, als niet journalist, ook baat bij kan hebben.
Wikileaks
Releases “Vault 7”: Reveals The CIA’s Hacking Tools
(ZHE) Last
night Wikileaks
announced that
it has released an encrypted torrent file which reportedly contains
information on the mysterious “Vault 7,” and which we now know is
the biggest “collection of material about CIA activities obtained
by WikiLeaks publication in history.” It can be downloaded now
at the following URL,
and accessed using the
password: “SplinterItIntoAThousandPiecesAndScatterItIntoTheWinds”
Wikileaks
had previously announced that it would hold an 8am Eastern press
conference, as part of the unveiling.
ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks press conference in under five hours at 8am ET / 1pm UTC / 14:00 CET. Streamed live. #askWL
However,
there appeared to have been some complications, with Wikileaks
tweeting that “the
press conference is under attack: Facebook+Periscope video used by
WikiLeaks’ editor Julian Assange have been attacked.
Activating contingency plans.”
Press conf under attack: Facebook+Periscope video used by WikiLeaks’ editor Julian Assange have been attacked. Activating contingency (1/2)
Wikileaks
then announced that “As Mr. Assange’s Perscipe+Facebook video
stream links are under attack his video press conference will be
rescheduled.”
NOTICE: As Mr. Assange’s Perscipe+Facebook video stream links are under attack his video press conference will be rescheduled.
In
a separate tweet, Wikileaks has just released the passphrase to
decrypt the torrent file: RELEASE: CIA Vault 7 Year Zero decryption
passphrase: SplinterItIntoAThousandPiecesAndScatterItIntoTheWinds
RELEASE: CIA Vault 7 Year Zero decryption passphrase:
SplinterItIntoAThousandPiecesAndScatterItIntoTheWinds
As
a result, since Assange appears to have been unable to launch his
previously scheduled press conference, he has gone ahead and issued
the press release on Vault
7 Part 1 “Year Zero, which
is titled: Inside
the CIA’s global hacking force:
Press
Release
Vault
7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed
Today,
Tuesday 7 March 2017, WikiLeaks begins its new series of leaks on the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Code-named “Vault 7” by
WikiLeaks, it is the largest ever publication of confidential
documents on the agency.
The
first full part of the series, “Year Zero”, comprises 8,761
documents and files from an isolated, high-security network situated
inside the CIA’s Center
for Cyber Intelligence in
Langley, Virgina. It follows an introductory disclosure last month
of CIA
targeting French political parties and candidates in the lead up to
the 2012 presidential election.
Recently,
the CIA lost control of the majority of its hacking arsenal including
malware, viruses, trojans, weaponized “zero day” exploits,
malware remote control systems and associated documentation. This
extraordinary collection, which amounts to more than several hundred
million lines of code, gives its possessor the entire hacking
capacity of the CIA. The archive appears to have been circulated
among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an
unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions
of the archive.
“Year
Zero” introduces the scope and direction of the CIA’s global
covert hacking program, its malware arsenal and dozens of “zero
day” weaponized exploits against a wide range of U.S. and European
company products, include Apple’s iPhone, Google’s Android and
Microsoft’s Windows and even Samsung TVs, which are turned into
covert microphones.
Since
2001 the CIA has gained political and budgetary preeminence over the
U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). The CIA found itself building
not just its now infamous drone fleet, but a very different type of
covert, globe-spanning force — its own substantial fleet of
hackers. The agency’s hacking division freed it from having to
disclose its often controversial operations to the NSA (its primary
bureaucratic rival) in order to draw on the NSA’s hacking
capacities.
By
the end of 2016, the CIA’s hacking division, which formally falls
under the agency’s Center
for Cyber Intelligence (CCI),
had over 5000 registered users and had produced more than a thousand
hacking systems, trojans, viruses, and other “weaponized”
malware. Such is the scale of the CIA’s undertaking that by 2016,
its hackers had utilized more code than that used to run Facebook.
The CIA had created, in effect, its “own NSA” with even less
accountability and without publicly answering the question as to
whether such a massive budgetary spend on duplicating the capacities
of a rival agency could be justified.
In
a statement to WikiLeaks the source details policy questions that
they say urgently need to be debated in public, including whether the
CIA’s hacking capabilities exceed its mandated powers and the
problem of public oversight of the agency. The source wishes to
initiate a public debate about the security, creation, use,
proliferation and democratic control of cyberweapons.
Once
a single cyber ‘weapon’ is ‘loose’ it can spread around the
world in seconds, to be used by rival states, cyber mafia and teenage
hackers alike.
Julian
Assange, WikiLeaks editor stated that “There is an extreme
proliferation risk in the development of cyber ‘weapons’.
Comparisons can be drawn between the uncontrolled proliferation of
such ‘weapons’, which results from the inability to contain them
combined with their high market value, and the global arms trade. But
the significance of “Year Zero” goes well beyond the choice
between cyberwar and cyberpeace. The disclosure is also exceptional
from a political, legal and forensic perspective.”
Wikileaks
has carefully reviewed the “Year Zero” disclosure and published
substantive CIA documentation while avoiding the distribution of
‘armed’ cyberweapons until a consensus emerges on the technical
and political nature of the CIA’s program and how such ‘weapons’
should analyzed, disarmed and published.
Wikileaks
has also decided to redact and
anonymise some identifying information in “Year Zero” for in
depth analysis. These redactions include ten of thousands of CIA
targets and attack machines throughout Latin America, Europe and the
United States. While we are aware of the imperfect results of any
approach chosen, we remain committed to our publishing model and note
that the quantity of published pages in “Vault 7” part one (“Year
Zero”) already eclipses the total number of pages published over
the first three years of the Edward Snowden NSA leaks.
* *
*
Analysis
CIA
malware targets iPhone, Android, smart TVs
CIA
malware and hacking tools are built by EDG (Engineering Development
Group), a software development group within CCI (Center for Cyber
Intelligence), a department belonging to the CIA’s DDI (Directorate
for Digital Innovation). The DDI is one of the five major
directorates of the CIA (see this organizational
chart of
the CIA for more details).
The
EDG is responsible for the development, testing and operational
support of all backdoors, exploits, malicious payloads, trojans,
viruses and any other kind of malware used by the CIA in its covert
operations world-wide.
The
increasing sophistication of surveillance techniques has drawn
comparisons with George Orwell’s 1984, but “Weeping Angel”,
developed by the CIA’s Embedded
Devices Branch (EDB),
which infests smart TVs, transforming them into covert microphones,
is surely its most emblematic realization.
The
attack against Samsung
smart TVs was
developed in cooperation with the United Kingdom’s MI5/BTSS. After
infestation, Weeping Angel places the target TV in a ‘Fake-Off’
mode, so that the owner falsely believes the TV is off when it is on.
In ‘Fake-Off’ mode the TV operates as a bug, recording
conversations in the room and sending them over the Internet to a
covert CIA server.
As
of October 2014 the CIA was also looking at infecting
the vehicle control systems used by modern cars and trucks.
The purpose of such control is not specified, but it would permit the
CIA to engage in nearly undetectable assassinations.
The
CIA’s Mobile Devices Branch (MDB) developed numerous
attacks to remotely hack and control popular smart phones.
Infected phones can be instructed to send the CIA the user’s
geolocation, audio and text communications as well as covertly
activate the phone’s camera and microphone.
Despite
iPhone’s minority share (14.5%) of the global smart phone market in
2016, a specialized unit in the CIA’s Mobile Development Branch
produces malware to infest, control and exfiltrate data from iPhones
and other Apple products running iOS, such as iPads.
CIA’s arsenal includes numerous
local and remote “zero days” developed
by CIA or obtained from GCHQ, NSA, FBI or purchased from cyber arms
contractors such as Baitshop. The disproportionate focus on iOS may
be explained by the popularity of the iPhone among social, political,
diplomatic and business elites.
A similar
unit targets Google’s Android which is used to run the majority of
the world’s smart phones (~85%) including Samsung, HTC and Sony.
1.15 billion Android powered phones were sold last year. “Year
Zero” shows that as of 2016 the
CIA had 24 “weaponized” Android “zero days” which
it has developed itself and obtained from GCHQ, NSA and cyber arms
contractors.
These
techniques permit the CIA to bypass the encryption of WhatsApp,
Signal, Telegram, Wiebo, Confide and Cloackman by hacking the “smart”
phones that they run on and collecting audio and message traffic
before encryption is applied.
CIA
malware targets Windows, OSx, Linux, routers
The
CIA also runs a very substantial effort to infect and
control Microsoft
Windows users with
its malware. This includes multiple local and remote weaponized “zero
days”, air gap jumping viruses such as “Hammer
Drill” which
infects software distributed on CD/DVDs, infectors
for removable media such as USBs,
systems to hide
data in images or
in covert disk areas ( “Brutal
Kangaroo”)
and to keep
its malware infestations going.
Many
of these infection efforts are pulled together by the CIA’s Automated
Implant Branch (AIB),
which has developed several attack systems for automated infestation
and control of CIA malware, such as “Assassin” and “Medusa”.
Attacks
against Internet infrastructure and webservers are developed by the
CIA’s Network
Devices Branch (NDB).
The
CIA has developed automated multi-platform malware attack and control
systems covering Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris, Linux and more, such as
EDB’s “HIVE” and the related “Cutthroat” and “Swindle”
tools, which are described
in the examples section below.
CIA
‘hoarded’ vulnerabilities (“zero days”)
In
the wake of Edward Snowden’s leaks about the NSA, the U.S.
technology industry secured a commitment from the Obama
administration that the executive would disclose on an ongoing basis
— rather than hoard — serious vulnerabilities, exploits, bugs or
“zero days” to Apple, Google, Microsoft, and other US-based
manufacturers.
Serious
vulnerabilities not disclosed to the manufacturers places huge
swathes of the population and critical infrastructure at risk to
foreign intelligence or cyber criminals who independently discover or
hear rumors of the vulnerability. If the CIA can discover such
vulnerabilities so can others.
The
U.S. government’s commitment to the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process came
after significant lobbying by US technology companies, who risk
losing their share of the global market over real and perceived
hidden vulnerabilities. The government stated that it would disclose
all pervasive vulnerabilities discovered after 2010 on an ongoing
basis.
“Year
Zero” documents show that the CIA breached the Obama
administration’s commitments. Many of the vulnerabilities used in
the CIA’s cyber arsenal are pervasive and some may already have
been found by rival intelligence agencies or cyber criminals.
As
an example, specific CIA malware revealed in “Year Zero” is able
to penetrate, infest and control both the Android phone and iPhone
software that runs or has run presidential Twitter accounts. The CIA
attacks this software by using undisclosed security vulnerabilities
(“zero days”) possessed by the CIA but if the CIA can hack these
phones then so can everyone else who has obtained or discovered the
vulnerability. As long as the CIA keeps these vulnerabilities
concealed from Apple and Google (who make the phones) they will not
be fixed, and the phones will remain hackable.
The
same vulnerabilities exist for the population at large, including the
U.S. Cabinet, Congress, top CEOs, system administrators, security
officers and engineers. By hiding these security flaws from
manufacturers like Apple and Google the CIA ensures that it can hack
everyone &mdsh; at the expense of leaving everyone hackable.
‘Cyberwar’
programs are a serious proliferation risk
Cyber
‘weapons’ are not possible to keep under effective control.
While
nuclear proliferation has been restrained by the enormous costs and
visible infrastructure involved in assembling enough fissile material
to produce a critical nuclear mass, cyber ‘weapons’, once
developed, are very hard to retain.
Cyber
‘weapons’ are in fact just computer programs which can be pirated
like any other. Since they are entirely comprised of information they
can be copied quickly with no marginal cost.
Securing
such ‘weapons’ is particularly difficult since the same people
who develop and use them have the skills to exfiltrate copies without
leaving traces — sometimes by using the very same ‘weapons’
against the organizations that contain them. There are substantial
price incentives for government hackers and consultants to obtain
copies since there is a global “vulnerability market” that will
pay hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars for copies of such
‘weapons’. Similarly, contractors and companies who obtain such
‘weapons’ sometimes use them for their own purposes, obtaining
advantage over their competitors in selling ‘hacking’ services.
Over
the last three years the United States intelligence sector, which
consists of government agencies such as the CIA and NSA and their
contractors, such as Booze Allan Hamilton, has been subject to
unprecedented series of data exfiltrations by its own workers.
A
number of intelligence community members not yet publicly named have
been arrested or subject to federal criminal investigations in
separate incidents.
Most
visibly, on February 8, 2017 a U.S. federal grand jury indicted
Harold T. Martin III with 20 counts of mishandling classified
information. The Department of Justice alleged that it seized some
50,000 gigabytes of information from Harold T. Martin III that he had
obtained from classified programs at NSA and CIA, including the
source code for numerous hacking tools.
Once
a single cyber ‘weapon’ is ‘loose’ it can spread around the
world in seconds, to be used by peer states, cyber mafia and teenage
hackers alike.
U.S.
Consulate in Frankfurt is a covert CIA hacker base
In
addition to its operations in Langley, Virginia the CIA also uses the
U.S. consulate in Frankfurt as a covert base for its hackers covering
Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
CIA
hackers operating out of the Frankfurt consulate ( “Center
for Cyber Intelligence Europe” or
CCIE) are given diplomatic (“black”) passports and State
Department cover. The
instructions for incoming CIA hackers make
Germany’s counter-intelligence efforts appear inconsequential:
“Breeze through German Customs because you have your
cover-for-action story down pat, and all they did was stamp your
passport”
Your
Cover Story (for this trip)
Q: Why are you
here?
A: Supporting technical consultations at the
Consulate.
Two
earlier WikiLeaks publications give further detail on CIA approaches
to customs and secondary
screening procedures.
Once
in Frankfurt CIA hackers can travel without further border checks to
the 25 European countries that are part of the Shengen open border
area — including France, Italy and Switzerland.
A
number of the CIA’s electronic attack methods are designed for
physical proximity. These attack methods are able to penetrate high
security networks that are disconnected from the internet, such as
police record database. In these cases, a CIA officer, agent or
allied intelligence officer acting under instructions, physically
infiltrates the targeted workplace. The attacker is provided with a
USB containing malware developed for the CIA for this purpose, which
is inserted into the targeted computer. The attacker then infects and
exfiltrates data to removable media. For example, the CIA attack
system Fine
Dining,
provides 24 decoy applications for CIA spies to use. To witnesses,
the spy appears to be running a program showing videos (e.g VLC),
presenting slides (Prezi), playing a computer game (Breakout2, 2048)
or even running a fake virus scanner (Kaspersky, McAfee, Sophos). But
while the decoy application is on the screen, the underlaying system
is automatically infected and ransacked.
How
the CIA dramatically increased proliferation risks
In
what is surely one of the most astounding intelligence own goals in
living memory, the CIA structured its classification regime such that
for the most market valuable part of “Vault 7” — the CIA’s
weaponized malware (implants + zero days), Listening Posts (LP), and
Command and Control (C2) systems — the agency has little legal
recourse.
The
CIA made these systems unclassified.
Why
the CIA chose to make its cyberarsenal unclassified reveals how
concepts developed for military use do not easily crossover to the
‘battlefield’ of cyber ‘war’.
To
attack its targets, the CIA usually requires that its implants
communicate with their control programs over the internet. If CIA
implants, Command & Control and Listening Post software were
classified, then CIA officers could be prosecuted or dismissed for
violating rules that prohibit placing classified information onto the
Internet. Consequently the CIA has secretly made most of its cyber
spying/war code unclassified. The U.S. government is not able to
assert copyright either, due to restrictions in the U.S.
Constitution. This means that cyber ‘arms’ manufactures and
computer hackers can freely “pirate” these ‘weapons’ if they
are obtained. The CIA has primarily had to rely on obfuscation to
protect its malware secrets.
Conventional
weapons such as missiles may be fired at the enemy (i.e into an
unsecured area). Proximity to or impact with the target detonates the
ordnance including its classified parts. Hence military personnel do
not violate classification rules by firing ordnance with classified
parts. Ordnance will likely explode. If it does not, that is not the
operator’s intent.
Over
the last decade U.S. hacking operations have been increasingly
dressed up in military jargon to tap into Department of Defense
funding streams. For instance, attempted “malware injections”
(commercial jargon) or “implant drops” (NSA jargon) are being
called “fires” as if a weapon was being fired. However the
analogy is questionable.
Unlike
bullets, bombs or missiles, most CIA malware is designed to live for
days or even years after it has reached its ‘target’. CIA malware
does not “explode on impact” but rather permanently infests its
target. In order to infect target’s device, copies of the malware
must be placed on the target’s devices, giving physical possession
of the malware to the target.
To
exfiltrate data back to the CIA or to await further instructions the
malware must communicate with CIA Command & Control (C2) systems
placed on internet connected servers. But such servers are typically
not approved to hold classified information, so CIA command and
control systems are also made unclassified.
A
successful ‘attack’ on a target’s computer system is more like
a series of complex stock maneuvers in a hostile take-over bid or the
careful planting of rumors in order to gain control over an
organization’s leadership rather than the firing of a weapons
system. If there is a military analogy to be made, the infestation of
a target is perhaps akin to the execution of a whole series of
military maneuvers against the target’s territory including
observation, infiltration, occupation and exploitation.
Evading
forensics and anti-virus
A
series of standards lay out CIA malware infestation patterns which
are likely to assist forensic crime scene investigators as well as
Apple, Microsoft, Google, Samsung, Nokia, Blackberry, Siemens and
anti-virus companies attribute and defend against attacks.
“Tradecraft
DO’s and DON’Ts” contains
CIA rules on how its malware should be written to avoid fingerprints
implicating the “CIA, US government, or its witting partner
companies” in “forensic review”. Similar secret standards cover
the use
of encryption to hide CIA hacker and malware
communication (pdf), describing
targets & exfiltrated data (pdf)
as well as executing
payloads (pdf)
and persisting (pdf)
in the target’s machines over time.
CIA
hackers developed successful attacks against most well known
anti-virus programs. These are documented in AV
defeats, Personal
Security Products, Detecting
and defeating PSPs and PSP/Debugger/RE
Avoidance.
For example, Comodo was defeated by CIA
malware placing itself in the Window’s “Recycle Bin”.
While Comodo 6.x has a “Gaping
Hole of DOOM”.
CIA
hackers discussed what the NSA’s “Equation Group” hackers did
wrong and how
the CIA’s malware makers could avoid similar exposure.
Examples
The
CIA’s Engineering Development Group (EDG) management system
contains around 500 different projects (only some of which are
documented by “Year Zero”) each with their own sub-projects,
malware and hacker tools.
The
majority of these projects relate to tools that are used for
penetration, infestation (“implanting”), control, and
exfiltration.
Another
branch of development focuses on the development and operation of
Listening Posts (LP) and Command and Control (C2) systems used to
communicate with and control CIA implants; special projects are used
to target specific hardware from routers to smart TVs.
Some
example projects are described below, but see the
table of contents for
the full list of projects described by WikiLeaks’ “Year Zero”.
UMBRAGE
The
CIA’s hand crafted hacking techniques pose a problem for the
agency. Each technique it has created forms a “fingerprint” that
can be used by forensic investigators to attribute multiple different
attacks to the same entity.
This
is analogous to finding the same distinctive knife wound on multiple
separate murder victims. The unique wounding style creates suspicion
that a single murderer is responsible. As soon one murder in the set
is solved then the other murders also find likely attribution.
The
CIA’s Remote
Devices Branch‘s UMBRAGE
group collects
and maintains a
substantial library of
attack techniques ‘stolen’ from malware produced in other states
including the Russian Federation.
With
UMBRAGE and related projects the CIA cannot only increase its total
number of attack types but also misdirect attribution by leaving
behind the “fingerprints” of the groups that the attack
techniques were stolen from.
UMBRAGE
components cover keyloggers, password collection, webcam capture,
data destruction, persistence, privilege escalation, stealth,
anti-virus (PSP) avoidance and survey techniques.
Fine
Dining
Fine
Dining comes with a standardized questionnaire i.e menu that CIA case
officers fill out. The questionnaire is used by the agency’s OSB
(Operational
Support Branch)
to transform the requests of case officers into technical
requirements for hacking attacks (typically “exfiltrating”
information from computer systems) for specific operations. The
questionnaire allows the OSB to identify how to adapt existing tools
for the operation, and communicate this to CIA malware configuration
staff. The OSB functions as the interface between CIA operational
staff and the relevant technical support staff.
Among
the list of possible targets of the collection are ‘Asset’,
‘Liason Asset’, ‘System Administrator’, ‘Foreign
Information Operations’, ‘Foreign Intelligence Agencies’ and
‘Foreign Government Entities’. Notably absent is any reference to
extremists or transnational criminals. The ‘Case Officer’ is also
asked to specify the environment of the target like the type of
computer, operating system used, Internet connectivity and installed
anti-virus utilities (PSPs) as well as a list of file types to be
exfiltrated like Office documents, audio, video, images or custom
file types. The ‘menu’ also asks for information if recurring
access to the target is possible and how long unobserved access to
the computer can be maintained. This information is used by the CIA’s
‘JQJIMPROVISE’ software (see below) to configure a set of CIA
malware suited to the specific needs of an operation.
Improvise
(JQJIMPROVISE)
‘Improvise’
is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and
execution vector selection for survey/exfiltration tools supporting
all major operating systems like Windows (Bartender), MacOS (JukeBox)
and Linux (DanceFloor). Its configuration utilities like Margarita
allows the NOC (Network Operation Center) to customize tools based on
requirements from ‘Fine Dining’ questionairies.
HIVE
HIVE
is a multi-platform CIA malware suite and its associated control
software. The project provides customizable implants for Windows,
Solaris, MikroTik (used in internet routers) and Linux platforms and
a Listening Post (LP)/Command and Control (C2) infrastructure to
communicate with these implants.
The
implants are configured to communicate via HTTPS with the webserver
of a cover domain; each operation utilizing these implants has a
separate cover domain and the infrastructure can handle any number of
cover domains.
Each
cover domain resolves to an IP address that is located at a
commercial VPS (Virtual Private Server) provider. The public-facing
server forwards all incoming traffic via a VPN to a ‘Blot’ server
that handles actual connection requests from clients. It is setup for
optional SSL client authentication: if a client sends a valid client
certificate (only implants can do that), the connection is forwarded
to the ‘Honeycomb’ toolserver that communicates with the implant;
if a valid certificate is missing (which is the case if someone tries
to open the cover domain website by accident), the traffic is
forwarded to a cover server that delivers an unsuspicious looking
website.
The
Honeycomb toolserver receives exfiltrated information from the
implant; an operator can also task the implant to execute jobs on the
target computer, so the toolserver acts as a C2 (command and control)
server for the implant.
Similar
functionality (though limited to Windows) is provided by the
RickBobby project.
See
the classified user and developer guides
for HIVE.
* *
*
FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS
Why
now?
WikiLeaks
published as soon as its verification and analysis were ready.
In
Febuary the Trump administration has issued an Executive Order
calling for a “Cyberwar” review to be prepared within 30 days.
While
the review increases the timeliness and relevance of the publication
it did not play a role in setting the publication date.
Redactions
Names,
email addresses and external IP addresses have been redacted in the
released pages (70,875 redactions in total) until further analysis is
complete.
-
Over-redaction: Some
items may have been redacted that are not employees, contractors,
targets or otherwise related to the agency, but are, for example,
authors of documentation for otherwise public projects that are used
by the agency. -
Identity
vs. person: the redacted names are replaced by user IDs
(numbers) to allow readers to assign multiple pages to a single
author. Given the redaction process used a single person may be
represented by more than one assigned identifier but no identifier
refers to more than one real person. -
Archive
attachments (zip, tar.gz, …) are replaced with a PDF
listing all the file names in the archive. As the archive content is
assessed it may be made available; until then the archive is
redacted. -
Attachments
with other binary content are replaced by a hex dump of the
content to prevent accidental invocation of binaries that may have
been infected with weaponized CIA malware. As the content is
assessed it may be made available; until then the content is
redacted. -
The tens
of thousands of routable IP addresses references (including
more than 22 thousand within the United States) that correspond to
possible targets, CIA covert listening post servers, intermediary
and test systems, are redacted for further exclusive investigation. -
Binary
files of non-public origin are only available as dumps to
prevent accidental invocation of CIA malware infected binaries.
Organizational
Chart
The organizational
chart corresponds
to the material published by WikiLeaks so far.
Since
the organizational structure of the CIA below the level of
Directorates is not public, the placement of the EDG and its branches
within the org chart of the agency is reconstructed from information
contained in the documents released so far. It is intended to be used
as a rough outline of the internal organization; please be aware that
the reconstructed org chart is incomplete and that internal
reorganizations occur frequently.
Wiki
pages
“Year
Zero” contains 7818 web pages with 943 attachments from the
internal development groupware. The software used for this purpose is
called Confluence, a proprietary software from Atlassian. Webpages in
this system (like in Wikipedia) have a version history that can
provide interesting insights on how a document evolved over time; the
7818 documents include these page histories for 1136 latest versions.
The
order of named pages within each level is determined by date (oldest
first). Page content is not present if it was originally dynamically
created by the Confluence software (as indicated on the
re-constructed page).
What
time period is covered?
The
years 2013 to 2016. The sort order of the pages within each level is
determined by date (oldest first).
WikiLeaks
has obtained the CIA’s creation/last modification date for each
page but these do not yet appear for technical reasons. Usually the
date can be discerned or approximated from the content and the page
order. If it is critical to know the exact time/date contact
WikiLeaks.
What
is “Vault 7”
“Vault
7” is a substantial collection of material about CIA activities
obtained by WikiLeaks.
When
was each part of “Vault 7” obtained?
Part
one was obtained recently and covers through 2016. Details on the
other parts will be available at the time of publication.
Is
each part of “Vault 7” from a different source?
Details
on the other parts will be available at the time of publication.
What
is the total size of “Vault 7”?
The
series is the largest intelligence publication in history.
How
did WikiLeaks obtain each part of “Vault 7”?
Sources
trust WikiLeaks to not reveal information that might help identify
them.
Isn’t
WikiLeaks worried that the CIA will act against its staff to stop the
series?
No.
That would be certainly counter-productive.
Has
WikiLeaks already ‘mined’ all the best stories?
No.
WikiLeaks has intentionally not written up hundreds of impactful
stories to encourage others to find them and so create expertise in
the area for subsequent parts in the series. They’re there. Look.
Those who demonstrate journalistic excellence may be considered for
early access to future parts.
Won’t
other journalists find all the best stories before me?
Unlikely.
There are very considerably more stories than there are journalists
or academics who are in a position to write them.
RELEASE: Vault 7 Part 1 “Year Zero”: Inside the CIA’s global hacking force wikileaks.org/ciav7p1
By Tyler
Durden /
Republished with permission / Zero
Hedge / Report
a typo
=========================
Vanmorgen bracht Anti-Media het bericht, dat n.a.v. de laatste Wikileaks documenten geconcludeerd kan worden, dat de CIA heel goed mogelijk de bron kan zijn geweest voor het (hysterische) nepnieuws, waarin wordt gesteld dat Rusland achter het lekken van de Clinton mails en het manipuleren van de VS presidentsverkiezingen zou zitten………. Zie voor dat laatste ook: ‘CIA speelt zoals gewoonlijk vuil spel: uit Wikileaks documenten blijkt dat CIA zelf de verkiezingen manipuleerde, waar het Rusland van beschuldigde……..‘
en: ‘CIA malware voor manipulaties en spionage >> vervolg Wikileaks Vault 7‘
en: ‘Campagne Clinton, smeriger dan gedacht…………‘ (met daarin daarin opgenomen de volgende artikelen: ‘Donna Brazile Bombshell: ‘Proof’ Hillary ‘Rigged’ Primary Against Bernie‘ en ‘Democrats in Denial After Donna Brazile Says Primary Was Rigged for Hillary‘)
en: ‘WikiLeaks: Seth Rich Leaked Clinton Emails, Not Russia‘
en: ‘Hillary Clinton en haar oorlog tegen de waarheid…….. Ofwel een potje Rusland en Assange schoppen!‘
en: ‘Murray, ex-ambassadeur van GB: de Russen hebben de VS verkiezingen niet gemanipuleerd‘
en: ‘Obama gaf toe dat de DNC e-mails expres door de DNC werden gelekt naar Wikileaks….!!!!‘
en: ‘VS ‘democratie’ aan het werk, een onthutsende en uitermate humoristische video!‘
en: ‘Democraten VS kochten informatie over Trump >> Forgetting the ‘Dirty Dossier’ on Trump‘
en: ‘Hillary Clinton moet op de hoogte zijn geweest van aankoop Steele dossier over Trump……..‘
en: ‘FBI Director Comey Leaked Trump Memos Containing Classified Information‘
en: ‘Publicly Available Evidence Doesn’t Support Russian Gov Hacking of 2016 Election‘
en: ‘Russia Is Trolling the Shit out of Hillary Clinton and the Mainstream Media‘
en: ‘Rusland zou onafhankelijkheid Californië willen uitlokken met reclame voor borsjt…….‘
en: ‘Rusland zou onafhankelijkheid Californië willen uitlokken met reclame voor borsjt…….‘
en: ‘WannaCry niet door Noord-Korea ‘gelanceerd!’‘
en: ‘False flag terror’ bestaat wel degelijk: bekentenissen en feiten over heel smerige zaken……….‘
Voor meer berichten n.a.v. het bovenstaande, klik op één van de labels, die u onder dit bericht terug kan vinden.
Mijn excuus voor de belabberde vormgeving.